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Abstract
We investigate the labor market effects of immigration in Denmark, Germany and
the UK, three countries which are characterized by considerable differences in labor
market institutions and welfare states. Institutions such as collective bargaining, min-
imum wages, employment protection and unemployment benefits affect the way in
which wages respond to labor supply shocks, and, hence, the labor market effects
of immigration. We employ a wage-setting approach which assumes that wages de-
cline with the unemployment rate, albeit imperfectly. We find that wage flexibility
is substantially higher in the UK compared to Germany and Denmark. As a conse-
quence, immigration has a much larger effect on the unemployment rate in Germany
and Denmark, while the wage effects are larger in the UK. Moreover, the elasticity of
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1 Introduction
Concerns that immigrants take jobs away from natives and reduce their wages are wide-
spread in most European countries. The current financial and economic crisis has further
fueled these fears and raised sentiments against immigration. The impacts of immigration
on labour markets are also subject of long-standing controversies in the academic literature.
While a substantial number of studies, mainly coming from the US and Europe, finds
no discernible effects on natives’ wages and employment opportunities (Card, 1990, 2001,
2005; Dustmann et al., 2005; Pischke and Velling, 1997)1, Borjas et al. (1996, 1997), Borjas
(2003) and Aydemir and Borjas (2007) provide evidence that the impact of immigration on
wages and unemployment may be substantial and argue that large parts of the literature
systematically tend to underestimate the labour market effects of immigration. These
controversial findings can be traced back to differences in the theoretical frameworks, the
specification of empirical models and different identification strategies.
In this paper we contribute to this literature by taking a fresh look at the effects of
immigration on employment and wages using a theoretical and empirical framework which
considers imperfect labor markets. Such labor markets are characterized by the presence
of labor market institutions, that is systems of laws, bargaining rules, unemployment
benefits and labor market programs, that shape the behavior of workers and employers.
These institutions differ considerably across countries. We therefore apply a cross-country
approach to analyze whether, and to what extent, the labor market effects of immigration
vary between countries depending on their institutional settings.
Based on a theoretical framework which assumes that wages adjust only imperfectly to
labor supply shocks, we use micro data from Denmark, Germany and the UK to estimate
the wage and employment effects of immigration in those countries. All three countries
have seen a substantial influx of migrants during the last two decades. From 1990 to
2010, cumulative net migration amounted to 8.6% of the population in Germany, 4.3%
in Denmark and 4.1% in the UK (World Bank, 2013). While migration to Germany
surged following the fall of the Iron Curtain, net migration to Denmark and the UK has
also accelerated substantially since the turn of the century, partly as a consequence of
the European Union’s Eastern enlargement. In the course of the financial and economic
crisis, net migration figures have soared in Germany, but declined in Denmark and the
UK relative to the 2008 level.
The institutions of the labor market and the welfare state of these three countries
are characterized by different institutional settings, as Table 1 illustrates. The so-called
Danish ‘flexicurity’ system features relatively weak employment protection and a high
rate of hirings and firings, but high transfers to unemployment households (Anderson
and Svarer, 2007). Moreover, industrial relations are characterized by a extremely high
1See also the meta-studies by Longhi et al., 2005, 2006, 2008.
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coverage of collective bargaining agreements and union membership density in Denmark.
Competition in national product markets as well as exposure to international competition
is high, suggesting that rents at the firm level are rather low. Finally, taxes are high and
progressive in Denmark, which in turn affects wage-setting for different groups in the labor
market in different ways (Lockwood et al., 2000).
Table 1: Institutional indicators for Denmark, Germany and the UK, 2010 or
latest available year
Denmark Germany UK
Collective bargaining coverage in %a 82 63 35
Union density in %b 68.5 18.6 26.4
Legal minimum wage no no yes
Net income of unemployed household as % of average employed net incomec
Single, no children 83 59 55
Married, one earner, two children 88 80 77
Net personal marginal tax rate %d
67% of average earnings 42.56 50.53 31.00
100% of average earnings 49.43 56.78 31.00
167% of average earnings 62.96 44.38 41.00
Strictness of employment protection (index)e 2.13 2.87 1.20
Product market regulation (index)f 0.99 1.27 0.79
Import penetration (in % of GDP)g 54 44 31
Export propensity (in % of GDP)h 50 46 29
Net migration 1990–2010 as % of populationi 4.3 8.6 4.2
a Collective bargaining coverage corresponds to wage and salary earners covered
by collective wage contracts divided by all wage and salary earners. Source:
OECD (2011).
b Union density corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners that are
trade union members divided by all wage and salary earners. Source: OECD
(2013).
c Measured at 67% of average earnings level. The ratio of the net income
of unemployed to employed households considers all types of benefits made
available to non-wage earners compared to wage earners as well as all taxes
for different household types. Source: OECD (2011).
d Principal earner, single household, no child, 2010. Source: OECD (2011).
e See Venn (2009) for the calculation of the employment protection indicator.
f Product market regulation index measures the level by which policies inhibit
competition. Source: OECD (2013).
g The import penetration rate is measured as the ratio of imports to GDP.
Source: OECD (2011).
h The export propensity rate is measured as the ratio of exports to GDP. Source:
OECD (2011).
i Source: World Bank (2013).
Germany is the archetypal example of a “continental” European welfare state, where
employment protection is strict and welfare benefits are relatively high. The level of
employment protection is significantly higher than in Denmark and the UK, while unem-
ployment benefits are below those in Denmark, but above those of the UK. Union density
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is relatively low, but Germany is still characterized by an intermediate coverage of col-
lective bargaining agreements. Moreover, many employers not officially participating in
collective bargaining informally apply the contents of collective agreements in their firms.
National product market competition is more strongly regulated than in Denmark or the
UK, but exposure to international competition is, for a country of this size, high.
Finally, the United Kingdom is characterized by weak employment protection and,
relative to the other two countries, low unemployment benefits. The UK typically has
a low coverage of collective bargaining agreements and an intermediate level of union
membership. In contrast to the other two countries, a legal minimum wage exists in
the UK. While national product market competition is strong, exposure to international
competition is weak compared to the other two countries.
All these institutional dimensions — the type and effectiveness of collective wage bar-
gaining, the system of unemployment benefits, the system of taxes, the level of employment
protection and the regulation of product markets — affect the wage-setting mechanism,
the reservation wage and the scope for bargaining, which in turn have an impact on the
responsiveness of wages to labor supply shocks. A comparative analysis of these three
countries therefore promises new insights into the impact of immigration.
Our theoretical framework derives the wage and employment effects of immigration
from a wage-setting approach (e.g. Layard and Nickell, 1986; Layard et al., 2005). A
similar framework has been recently adopted for an empirical investigation of the labour
market effects of migration by Bru¨cker and Jahn (2011) and Felbermayr et al. (2010). This
approach rests on the empirically supported assumption that wages respond to changes in
the unemployment rate, albeit imperfectly. The elasticity between wages and unemploy-
ment depends on the wage-setting mechanism, other labor market institutions which affect
the reservation wage and the value of the outside option, and competition in product mar-
kets which determines inter alia the scope for wage bargaining or efficiency wages. Thus,
the elasticity between wages and unemployment reflects the different institutional features
which characterize the three countries we investigate. In our empirical application of this
approach we assume that the elasticity of this wage-setting curve varies across different
types of workers.
Once wages are fixed, firms adjust their employment in a way which maximizes their
profits. Applying this right-to-manage assumption — which in our view reasonably cap-
tures industrial relations in the three countries we investigate — we can derive the labor
demand of firms by using a production function approach. Having estimated the elastici-
ties of the wage-setting curves and the elasticities of substitution between different types
of labor, we can solve for the wage and employment effects of immigration simultaneously
and simulate the labor market effects of immigration for different groups.
The production function approach was pioneered by Grossman (1982) and Borjas
(1987) in the immigration literature and experienced a renaissance since the seminal pa-
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pers by Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012).2 Analogous to this literature we
approximate production technologies by a nested CES function, which distinguishes labor
by education, experience and national origin. Relying on similar assumptions about pro-
duction technologies as other structural estimation approaches is in our view a strength,
since it makes our findings at least partially comparable.
Nevertheless, it is important to understand the differences between our model and
estimation strategy and the standard approaches in this strand of the literature: Borjas
(2003) (in the structural part of his paper), Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and others derive
the wage effects of immigration from a framework where labour supply is assumed to be
exogenous and inelastic. This assumption inter alia rules out involuntary unemployment
which is an ubiquitous phenomenon, at least in the European context.3 In contrast, we
replace a standard labour supply function by a set of wage-setting equations where wages
are explained by the unemployment rate, and – following the nested structure of the
production function – numerous labour demand equations.
Our theoretical framework has important consequences for the identification strategy in
this paper. Both the wage-setting equations and the labor demand equations are affected
by simultaneity bias. The simultaneity problem arises in the wage setting equations since
an unobserved shock to the wage will — via the demand curve — raise unemployment,
and this will bias the estimate of the (assumed negative) coefficient towards zero. Suit-
able instruments should be therefore exogenously correlated with the unemployment rate
without affecting the wage directly. Following the literature we use instruments capturing
exogenous export demand and sectoral technology shocks.
Analogously, the labour demand equations suffer from a simultaneity problem if an
unobserved shock to labour demand, via the wage-setting curve, raises the wage and, thus,
bias the estimated coefficient towards zero. A suitable instrument is thus a variable which
affects wages without directly affecting labour demand. We therefore use instruments
which affect the reservation wage, for example household composition or the household
income of unemployed individuals. The reservation wage should affect the wage rate, but
not directly labour demand.
Thus, the use of an imperfect labour market framework leads to a different estimation
strategy compared to a framework which treats labour supply as exogenous and inelas-
tic. Nevertheless, our approach also shares many features with the traditional literature,
i.e. the nested structure of the production function and the respective classification of
workers by education, experience and national origin. These classification decisions are
often disputed; see the contributions and comments by Borjas et al. (2012), Card (2012),
2Other important contributions are Aydemir and Borjas (2007), D’Amuri et al. (2010)and Manacorda
et al. (2012).
3Some of the papers above also supplement their analysis by employment regressions in order to address
the effects of immigration on unemployment. However, the theoretical framework analysing the wage
impact is at least implicitly derived from a framework with clearing labour markets and inelastic labour
supply.
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Dustmann and Preston (2012), Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Manacorda et al. (2012)
in the Journal of the European Economic Association. Most controversial is the extent to
which natives and migrants in particular education and experience classes are close sub-
stitutes. From a policy perspective this is an important issue because the distributional
effects of immigration are largely affected by the elasticity of substitution between natives
and immigrants. We examine this issue by applying different classifications of education
and experience groups, and by using different weights.
Our contribution can be considered to be complementary to the large literature which
attempts to estimate the wage and employment effects of immigration directly (Altonji
and Card, 1991; Borjas et al., 1996; Pischke and Velling, 1997; Dustmann et al., 2005;
Glitz, 2012; Friedberg and Hunt, 1995, for a review). The most common approach in this
literature is to use the variation in migration rates across geographical areas, in which the
wage or employment rate of natives in a given location is regressed on the relative quantity
of immigrants in that same area, with appropriate controls. One of the main difficulties
of this strategy arises from immigrants’ potentially endogenous choice of location. Many
researchers use therefore either experimental- or quasi-experimental evidence (e.g. Card,
1990; Glitz, 2012; Kugler and Yuksel, 2009), or instrumental variable estimation strategies
(e.g. Dustmann et al., 2005; Pischke and Velling, 1997). However, it is still possible
that this approach fails to allow for other factors which might bias results, such when
capital movements, trade or natives’ labor mobility spread the effects of immigration to
other regions.4 Moreover, the spatial correlation approach enables one only to identify the
partial effects of immigration rather than the cross effects between different segments of the
labor market. Nevertheless, the direct approach imposes less structure on the estimation
equations and the outcomes depend therefore less on theoretical assumptions which remain
somewhat arbitrary. In this sense, the findings of both strands of the literature should
reinforce each other.
Another contribution of our paper is the use of a comparative approach. While there
are numerous single-country studies which apply both structural approaches and direct
estimates of the wage and employment effects of immigration, these studies typically differ
in their methodological approaches, the specifications of the estimated equations, the
treatment of the data and the time periods covered. There are therefore severe limitations
in the comparability of the findings. One of the few exceptions in the literature is the
cross-country study by Aydemir and Borjas (2007), which analyzes the wage effects of
immigration in Canada, Mexico and the US, employing a production function framework
and using disaggregated micro data. Nevertheless, due to data limitations the time periods
covered by this study still differ somewhat across countries.
Our empirical analysis is based on micro data sets in Denmark, Germany and the UK
which provide annual observations. These data are derived from social security records
4See Borjas (2003) and Borjas et al. (1997), for controversial evidence Card (2001, 2005), Card and
DiNardo (2000) and Peri and Sparber (2011).
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from Denmark and Germany and household survey data from the UK. These data bases
enable us to cover the same time period, namely the period from 1993-2009, although
further observations are available in Germany and the UK. Albeit some limitations in the
comparability of the data still remain, we have tempted to harmonize the definitions and
classifications in the individual data sets as much as possible. Therefore we argue that the
findings in this paper are more comparable than those from the single-country studies in
the literature.
The comparative approach in this paper allows us to provide new insights in two
particular areas. First, our estimates of the wage curve allow us to assess whether wage
rigidities differ across countries, and, therefore whether immigration has differential wage
effects. Although we cannot trace the direct effect of particular labour market institutions
on the extent of this wage rigidity, this does at least provide some indirect evidence
on the role of labour market institutions. Second, our estimates of the labor demand
equations allow us to assess the extent to which the elasticites of substitution (particularly
between natives and migrants) differ across countries. Applying several robustness checks
demonstrate furthermore how sensitive these estimates are across countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our theoretical
framework. Section 3 briefly describes the data we use.5 Section 4 presents the empirical
model, the identification strategy and the estimation results for the elasticities of the
wage-setting curves and the parameters of the production function. Section 5 simulates
the employment and wage impact of immigration in Denmark, Germany and the UK.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Wage-setting theories
Building on Boeri and Bru¨cker (2005), Bru¨cker and Jahn (2011) and Levine (1999) we
apply a wage-setting framework to analyze the wage and employment effects of immigra-
tion. Our model replaces the conventional labor supply curve with a wage-setting function.
This wage-setting function relies on the simple assumption that wages decline with the
unemployment rate, albeit imperfectly. This relationship is empirically widely supported,
both at the macro level (e.g. Layard and Nickell, 1986; Layard et al., 2005) and at the
regional level (Blanchflower and Oswald 1994; 2005). Theoretically, the assumption of a
wage-setting function can be derived from right-to-manage models of collective bargaining
(Nickell and Andrews, 1983) and efficiency wage theories derived from turnover cost (Sa-
lop, 1979) or shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) models. These models have in common
5A detailed description is provided separately in Appendix B.
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the idea that the slope of the wage-setting curve depends on both the mark-up of the wage
over the outside option of workers, and on the value of the outside option.
We do not present an explicit collective bargaining or efficiency wage model here, since
different types of models may be relevant in our context. Instead, we think of the elasticity
of the wage-setting curve as the composite effect of wage-setting mechanisms and other
labor market institutions which affect the elasticity of the wage with respect to labor
supply changes. We expect that the slope of the wage-setting curve will vary across the
three countries in our analysis for a number of reasons.
First, the three countries are characterized by different types of collective bargaining
institutions as well as different levels of union density and union coverage. Collective
bargaining is heavily concentrated in Denmark, where union density and the coverage of
collective agreements is also very high. Collective wage agreements play thus a major role
in the determination of wages and the bargaining power of trade unions can be considered
as relatively high, suggesting that the wage mark-up is also relatively high. Germany is
an intermediate case. Albeit wage bargaining is centralized as well, the union density is
low and the coverage of collective contracts have an intermediate level. Finally, the UK is
a classical example for decentralized bargaining, where union density is intermediate, but
the coverage of collective wage agreements is low. Other wage-setting mechanisms such
as efficiency wages or shirking models may be more relevant here.
Second, Germany has a relatively high level of employment protection, compared to
the UK and Denmark. Insider-outsider models of collective bargaining (Lindbeck and
Snower, 1987, 2001) would therefore predict that the slope of the wage-setting curve is
flatter in Germany compared to the UK and Denmark.
Third, transfers to unemployed households are high in Denmark, significantly lower
in Germany and lowest in the UK. Both collective bargaining and efficiency wage models
predict that this would result, ceteris paribus, in a flatter wage-setting curve in Denmark
and Germany compared to the UK.
Fourth, high and progressive taxes may affect the responsiveness of wages for different
groups of workers in different ways. Lockwood et al. (2000) find evidence that progres-
sive taxes increase wages for high and medium skilled workers, while wages of less skilled
workers remain unaffected. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that the wage respon-
siveness to labor supply shocks declines with the skill level of workers in countries with
very progressive tax systems such as Denmark.
Fifth, product markets are much more regulated in Germany compared to the UK and
Denmark. This would reduce the scope for collective bargaining in the latter countries
and, hence, increase the responsiveness of wages to changes in the unemployment rate.
However, the high exposure to international competition, particularly in the manufacturing
sector in Germany, might reduce the potential impact of product market regulation in that
country.
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Thus, the slope of the wage-setting curve is likely to vary between the three countries
considered in our study as the complexity of the institutional differences allows no un-
ambiguous predictions. It remains therefore an empirical question whether and to what
extent the elasticity of the wage-setting curves will differ.
Finally, following a suggestion by Card (1995), we do not assume that the slope of
the wage-setting curve is uniform for all types of workers. The slope of the wage-setting
curve is likely to vary with the bargaining power and the human capital characteristics of
workers. We therefore allow the elasticity of the wage-setting curve to differ by skill levels
in our empirical analysis.
2.2 A wage-setting model of migration
Consider an economy where output is produced with different types of labor and capital.
LetN ` be the pre-migration labor force in each cell of the labor market, where the subscript
` = 1, . . . , n denotes the type of labor. The post-migration labor force is then given by
N` = N ` + γ`M,
n∑
`=1
γ` = 1, (1)
where M is the total stock of migrants γ` is the share of workers of type ` in the total
immigrant inflow.
Firms produce varieties of a differentiated good under monopolistic competition. Pro-
duction involves some fixed setup costs, but thereafter each firm produces output with
constant returns to scale. Hence, production of a representative firm i is given by
Y i = F (Li,Ki), (2)
where Y i denotes a variety of the output good, Li the vector of labor inputs, Ki is
physical capital. Firms do not necessarily employ the entire labor force, i.e. L` ≤ N`. The
production technology F (·) is increasing, concave, twice continuously differentiable in all
inputs and homogeneous of degree one.
Wages and the demand for labor are determined sequentially. In the first stage wages
are determined, and in the second stage, given the agreed wages, firms set prices and hire
workers up to a level where profits are maximized. Suppose that each firm faces a constant
elasticity of demand η > 1. Profit maximization implies that the wage rate equals
wi` = P
iY iL` ∀ `,
where P i is the product price of variety i of the output good, and Y iL` is the marginal
product of labor of type `.6
6One could consider a price mark-up assuming an imperfect competition framework in addition. Since
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Assuming that firms are identical, we can move to the level of the aggregate economy
by writing wi` = w`, Y
i
L`
= YL` , and P
i = P = 1, where we have normalized the price level
to one. The real wage is then given by
w` = YL` , ∀ `. (3)
In the first stage of the decision process, firms and employees set wages as a function of
unemployment, which enables us to write the aggregate wage-setting equation as
w` = f`(u`), f
′
` < 0, ∀ `, (4)
where f` is a function that captures the response of the wage to the unemployment rate
u` = 1 − L`/N`. The rationale behind equation (4) is that a higher unemployment rate
weakens the outside options of workers and, hence, reduces their wages, as outlined in
Section 2.1.
The wage-setting relation in equation (4) and the relationship between the real wage
and marginal product of labor in equation (3) allow us to solve for the employment response
to a change in foreign labor supply. This requires solving a system of equations which is
determined by the wage-setting curves and the production function for each type of labor.
This system has to satisfy, in each cell of the labor market, the implicit function
Ω`(L,M) ≡ YL`(L,K(N(M)))− f`(u`(L`, N`(M))) = 0, ∀ `. (5)
Note that equation (5) implies that the capital stock may adjust to labor supply shocks,
i.e., that ∂K/∂N ≥ 0. Differentiating this system implicitly with respect to a marginal
labor supply shock through immigration yields, for the change in employment
dL
dM
=
(
∂YL
∂L
− ∂f
∂u
∂u
∂L
)−1
×
(
∂f
∂u
∂u
∂N
dN
dM
− ∂YL
∂K
∂K
∂N
dN
dM
)
, (6)
where YL denotes a vector of the marginal products of labor in each cell as in equa-
tion (3), f the vector of wage-setting functions that determines the wage response to the
unemployment rate as outlined in equation (4), and u is the vector of unemployment rates.
Having solved for the equilibrium employment response, it is straightforward to use
the relation in equation (3) to derive the wage effects of migration:
dw
dM
=
∂YL
∂L
dL
dM
+
∂YL
∂K
∂K
∂N
dN
dM
. (7)
It is clear that the employment response to migration in equation (6) decreases with (i) the
absolute value of the elasticity of the wage with respect to the unemployment rate, (ii) the
adjustment of the capital stock to the labor supply shock and (iii) the elasticity between
this does not add anything to the results of our analysis, we rely on the most parsimonious framework for
the sake of convenience here.
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the marginal product of labor and the capital stock. The response declines with the
absolute value of the elasticity between the marginal product of labor and employment.7
In contrast, wages decline with the absolute elasticity of the wage-setting curve.
This simple model establishes the general framework for our analysis. In the empirical
specification of the model we distinguish labor by education, work experience and national
origin. The wage-setting curves are estimated separately for the different skill groups in
the labor force, while the labor demand functions for the different types of labor are
estimated by using a nested CES production function.
3 Description of the data
We use three micro data sets in our empirical analysis: the Integrated Database for Labor
Market Research (IDA) in Denmark, the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) in
Germany and the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the UK. The IDA and the
IEB are administrative data derived from social security records, while the LFS is based
on quarterly household surveys.
The IDA is compiled from a variety of sources such as the population register, the
labor force and unemployment registers and administrative tax data (Statistics Denmark,
2007). It covers the entire population including all employed and unemployed persons.
Immigrants can be identified both by their country of birth and citizenship.
The IEB is a 5% random sample of all employees registered with the social security
system, and of all unemployment benefit recipients in Germany. Self-employed individuals
and civil servants who are not obliged to pay social security contributions (Beamte) are
not covered in the data set. As with the IDA, the IEB is compiled from a variety of ad-
ministrative data sources which comprise, inter alia information on employment histories
provided by the German pension system and on unemployed benefit recipients provided
by the Federal Employment Services (Dorner et al., 2010). Due to the German jus sanguis
tradition, the data set identifies foreigners only by citizenship.
Administrative data on earnings in the UK are not available to researchers. The largest
survey which contains information on migration status is the UK Labour Force Survey,8
a quarterly random sample of 60,000 households (Office for National Statistics, 2011).
Each quarter of the LFS sample is made up of five waves, each of approximately 12,000
households. Each wave is interviewed in five successive quarters. As a result, there is an
80% overlap in the samples for successive quarters. The UK LFS contains information on
wages, qualification, occupational status, unemployment, the country of birth of foreigners
7Note that the derivative of the unemployment rate with respect to employment is negative, while it is
positive with respect to the labor force.
8The Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) provides a larger sample size, but no information
on nationality or country of birth.
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as well as information on citizenship. Wage information is not available before 1993, so
we use the 1993–2010 period in our analysis.
Since the purpose of our study is to analyze the effects of exogenous changes in the
immigrant workforce, the measure of the immigrant labour supply should be as free as
possible from measurement error that would otherwise attenuate our estimates, a problem
also highlighted recently by Aydemir and Borjas (2011) and Manacorda et al. (2012).
Attenuation bias is ruled out by definition in the Danish data, where we can use the
entire population. It is also no concern in Germany, where both the sample size and the
sampling methodology rules out that immigrants – in the definition we apply here – are
under-represented. Although smaller than the German and Danish samples, the LFS is
the largest UK data source available to researchers which provides information on wages
and employment spells for natives and immigrants.9 Because of its smaller size, there may
be concerns that UK estimates suffer from attenuation bias as a result of measurement
error in the proportion of foreigners in a labour market cell. However, our estimate of the
size of the likely bias (see Aydemir and Borjas, Eq. 8) is under 2%, largely because the
cell sizes we use are still relatively large.
The sample periods are largely harmonized across countries. In our estimates of the
wage-setting curves we use the 1993-2009 period in all three countries, since the choice
of the time period might be particularly relevant here due to the financial crisis. For the
elasticities of substitution we chose the 1993-2010 period for Germany and the UK, while
we used the 1993-2009 period for Denmark. Observations for 2010 are not yet available for
Denmark. We decided to chose the maximum period in case of Germany and the UK here,
since the results turned out to be more robust if the period is longer, albeit differences are
altogether modest.
We harmonize the definitions and categories in the three data sets as far as possible,
although some differences remain. The most important difference is that the Danish
IDA and the UK LFS allow us to identify immigrants by country of birth, while the
German IEB distinguishes natives and foreigners by citizenship. We therefore use further
information from the IEB to get as close as possible to the internationally comparable
concept of foreign-born. First, we classify all individuals as foreigners who are reported
as foreign citizens in their first available spell. This prevents naturalizations from being
recorded as a declining foreigner share in our sample. Second, we define ethnic Germans –
so-called Spa¨taussiedler – as foreigners. In the IEB ethnic Germans are coded as German
citizens. However, we are able to identify this group by their participation in active labor
market programs especially designed for ethnic Germans (such as language courses and
other integration programs). This enables us to identify the overwhelming share of this
non-trivial immigrant influx of about 3.1 million persons since the fall of the Iron Curtain.
The main remaining difference between the measure of migrants in the German data and
9It has been used recently to estimate wage effects of immigration in the UK by Dustmann et al. (2008)
and Manacorda et al. (2012).
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the foreign-born measure is that we are not able to exclude second- and third-generation
immigrants who did not acquire German citizenship before entering the labor force.10
We classify native and foreign workers by education and work experience. In our view
it is most suitable to distinguish three education groups in European labor markets: low
skilled workers, skilled workers and workers with a university degree. Since educational
systems differ across our three countries, we have used country-specific classifications.
Statistics Denmark provides information on the highest attained education. Low skilled
workers are defined as those who left school without any further education, medium skilled
workers have a vocational training degree and high skilled workers hold at least a bachelor
degree. In Germany we classify workers by educational degrees as well: low skilled workers
have no vocational degree, medium skilled workers a vocational training degree and high
skilled workers a university degree. In the UK, low skilled workers are defined as those
who left school at 17 or younger, medium skilled workers are those who left school between
18 and 20, and high-skilled individuals left education at 21 years or older.11
We distinguish four groups of work experience: 5 years or less, 6 to 10 years, 11 to 19
years, 21 years or more. This ensures that we have sufficient observations in each cell of
the labor market in all three data sets.
As robustness checks, we used also alternative measures for education and experi-
ence: First, we used occupation instead of education for controlling for the potential
skill-downgrading of immigrants. Second, assuming that work experience acquired abroad
is downgraded after arrival as well, but converges over time, we counted as an alternative
experience measure for the first ten years after arrival only the experience acquired in the
host country, while after ten years the total work experience is considered. Finally, we
combined both alternative classifications. Details are discussed in section 4.2.
We consider male and female workers throughout our analysis. Since the German data
set does not contain information on hourly wages and hourly wages for part-time workers
with few hours are known to be of bad quality, we consider full-time employees in all three
data sets. Unemployed individuals are identified in the Danish and the German data set
as recipients of unemployment benefits and allowances, while the UK LFS relies on the
self-reported ILO definition of unemployment. Wages are deflated by the CPI.
In the wage-setting equations we consider as macroeconomic controls the real GDP
growth rate, annual inflation of all prices (the GDP deflator) and an export propensity
index (ratio of exports to GDP). The first two variables have been taken from the World
Development Indicator database of the World Bank (2013), the latter one from the OECD
(2013). As instrumental variables we use an export demand index, a trade-weighted index
10As a robustness check, we have also produced data sets for Denmark and the UK which identify
foreigners by citizenship. The results do not differ greatly, and we therefore restrict the analysis presented
here to the more common concept of foreign-born.
11These three groups capture the three basic levels of educational qualification in the UK, namely GCSE,
A-level and university degree.
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of the GDP of the trading partners in the OECD, which has been calculated based on
data provided by the OECD (2013), and an industry-mix variable, a shift-share index of
employment growth, which has been derived from our micro data. For the estimates of the
elasticities of substitution we use in Denmark the average age of the youngest child as an
instrument, an information which is provided by the IDA data set. In Germany we consider
the average number of children of an age between eight and sixteen, an information which
has been collected from the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP). Finally, in the UK we
use the median household income of unemployed individuals from the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS). In addition we use for the estimates of the elasticities of substitution
between natives and immigrants as instruments an government ideology index, which is
provided by Bjørnskov (2008), and the minimum wage in the UK (Low Pay Commission).
A detailed description of the three data sets and the definitions of the variables are
presented in Appendix B; Table 9 contains also a list of all control and instrumental
variables.
Table 2 presents some descriptive information of the data. The skill structure of em-
ployment reveals some interesting differences between the three countries. In Denmark,
the immigrant workforce is concentrated in both the low and high education groups rel-
ative to natives. In Germany, immigrants are over-represented in the group with low
education, but under-represented in the medium and high skilled groups. Finally, in the
UK, immigrant workers are much better qualified as natives and display disproportional
high shares in the high and medium skill groups.
In all three countries we observe that immigrants are disproportionately affected by
unemployment. In Denmark the unemployment rates of immigrants in 2009 exceed those
of natives by a factor between 2.2 and 2.3 depending on the education group; in Germany
by a factor of 1.6 and 2.2, in the groups of medium and high skilled workers, respectively,
while unemployment of immigrants is below that of natives in the less skilled group. In the
UK, differences in unemployment rates between immigrants and natives vary by a factor
of between 1.4 and 1.7.
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Table 2: Employment, unemployment, and wages by education, 2009
Education groupa in % Unemployment rateb by Wagesc by
of total employment education group in % education group
Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High
Denmark
Natives 24.95 63.64 11.41 7.25 4.41 3.79 150.93 178.68 228.65
Immigrants 33.87 51.87 14.26 15.83 10.21 8.41 141.92 162.65 210.73
Germany
Natives 5.68 78.44 15.88 43.05 13.81 5.18 73.35 85.73 145.26
Immigrants 26.42 62.95 10.62 36.48 22.00 11.51 65.07 77.36 132.57
UK
Natives 55.30 20.79 23.91 12.40 8.50 4.82 10.00 11.88 15.73
Immigrants 23.02 29.33 47.65 18.27 11.57 8.29 9.15 9.79 14.26
a In Denmark, low education is defined as no vocational training, medium education as vocational training,
and high education as a bachelor or above. In Germany, low education is defined as no vocational
training, medium education as vocational training, and high education by a university degree. In the
UK, education levels are defined by age left school: low < 18, medium: 18-21, high: ≥ 21.
b The unemployment rate is defined here as the ratio of all unemployed persons to the sum of full-time
employed and all unemployed persons. Note that part-time workers who are not covered by our definition
of employed workers are disproportionately represented in the low skilled segment of the labor market.
c In Denmark, wages are defined as hourly wages in Danish Crowns (2000 constant prices), in Germany
as daily wages in Euros (2005 constant prices), and in UK as hourly wages in British Pounds (2005
constant prices).
Not surprisingly, wages of immigrant workers are lower than those of native workers.
In Denmark, the wages of low, medium and high-skill immigrants are, respectively, 6%, 9%
and 8% below those of equivalent natives in 2009. In Germany, wage levels of low, medium
and high-skill immigrants are, respectively, 11%, 10% and 9% below those of equivalent
natives at the same time. Finally, wage differentials between native and immigrant workers
are 8% for low, 18% for medium, and 9% for high skilled employees in the UK in 2009.
4 Empirical specification and estimation
4.1 Wage-setting equations
The first step of our empirical analysis is the estimation of the wage-setting equations. As
outlined in Section 2, we expect the wage-setting curves to vary across different groups
in the labor market. For the estimation we use the variance in the data across education
(q = 1, 2, 3) and experience groups (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) as defined in Section 3, but impose the
restriction that the slope parameter of the wage-setting curve is uniform across experience
groups. This increases the efficiency of estimation without imposing a too demanding
restriction on the parameter of interest.
More specifically, we estimate the following wage-setting equation separately for each
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country:12
lnwqjt = βq lnuqjt + λqjτqjt + η
′xt + qjt, (8)
where uqjt denotes the unemployment rate in education-experience cell (q, j), τqjt is an
education-experience specific deterministic time trend, and xt is a vector of control vari-
ables. As controls we use in all three countries the real GDP growth rate, the annual
inflation of all prices measured by the GDP deflator, and an export propensity indicator
which is defined as the ratio of export to GDP and captures thus external demand in the
goods markets.13 We thus capture both domestic and external shocks in output, demand
and prices. The error term qjt is specified as a one-way error component model with a
fixed effect for each education-experience cell (q, j).
The specification of equation (8) is similar to that used in the wage-setting and wage
curve literature, but it differs in that it allows the elasticity between wages and the un-
employment rate to vary across education groups. This enables us to capture different
degrees of wage flexibility in different skill segments of the labor market.
A simultaneity problem arises in the estimation of (8) if an unobserved shock to the
wage will via the demand curve raise unemployment, and this will bias the estimate of
the (assumed negative) coefficient towards zero. Using lags as IVs does not help here,
because an unobserved persistent wage shock occurred in the past, raising lagged wages
and unemployment, as well as current ones. Moreover, unemployment might itself be a
affected by the wage rate. Beyond controlling for other factors affecting wages, we have
therefore to find an exogenous IV for the unemployment rate without directly affecting the
wage equation. Suitable IVs considered in the literature are trade-weighted measures of
foreign economic activity and sector-specific demand indices (Blanchard and Katz, 1992;
Carlsson et al., 2008, 2006; Forslund et al., 2008).
We apply two instrumental variables here. The first one — the export demand index –
is defined as the log GDP of the trading partners in the OECD weighted by their average
trade shares during the sampling period (see Annex B.3 for the calculation of the variable).
This variable should capture exogenous demand shifts in open economies. It is a valid
instrument if wages and prices are rigid in the short-run - which is supported by ample
empirical evidence - such that an external demand shock should affect (un-)employment
in the first place and wages only in the second place via a change in the (un-)employment
rate. This is what standard open-economy macroeconomic models predict (Baldwin and
Wyplosz, 2012; Krugman et al., 2011), but also more sophisticated models which consider
search-frictions (Carlsson et al., 2008).
Our second IV is borrowed from the regional wage curve literature (e.g. Bartik, 1991;
Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994). A popular instrument for the
(un-)employment rate is a shift and share measure of local industrial mix that predicts
12Country subscripts are omitted to clarify the notation
13see Appendix B for a definition of variables
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the local employment growth rate under the assumption that each of the state’s industries
had the same employment growth rate as the national average employment growth rate
for that sector there (Bartik, 1991, 1993; Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Bound and Holczer,
2000). Analogously we constructed an industry mix variable which measures how much
of the deviation in employment growth in each education-experience cell from the average
employment growth can be explained by the concentration of workers in the respective cell
in fast or slow growing industries (see Annex B.3 for the calculation of the variable). This
variable captures how much of the change in employment can be attributed to a shift in
sectoral structure, triggered by exogenous factors such as technological change. It is a valid
instrument if national industry growth rates are uncorrelated with labor supply shocks in
the education-experience cell. This in turn will be true if sectoral employment is not too
concentrated in any education-experience cell, a condition that appears satisfied in the
data set used. Because we use the deviation of this variable from the national growth rate
of employment, this deviation will be a good instrument if the education-experience cells
differ sufficiently in their sectoral employment composition. This condition also appears
to be satisfied.
Throughout our regressions we follow Borjas et al. (2012) in weighting the cells by the
inverse of the variance of the log mean wage which controls inter alia for sampling error in
the wages14 Only as robustness checks, we also apply weights which refer to the cell size.
In our regressions, we refer to the 1993-2009 sample period, i.e. we consider exactly the
same period for all three countries, although some further observations are available for
Germany and the UK.15
14More specifically, we use the following weight in the wage regressions: ωqjt =
1
var[ln w¯qjt]
=
Lqjt(w¯qjt)
2
sFqjt(σ
F
qjt)
2+sHqjt(σ
H
qjt)
2 , where Lqjt denotes the number of employed workers in education group q and ex-
perience group j, w¯qjt the mean wage, s
F
qjt the share of immigrants in the labor force of education group
q and experience group j, sHqjt the respective share of natives, and (σ
F
qjt)
2 and (σHqjt)
2 the variance of the
wages in the respective education-experience cell of immigrants and natives, respectively.
15Robustness checks suggest that prolonging the sampling period increases somewhat the regression
coefficients, but does not alter qualitatively our results.
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Table 3: Estimates of the wage-setting curve
Education level Coeff. SE R2 Obs.
IV
Denmarka
All −0.115∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.98 192
Low −0.121∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.98 64
Medium −0.093∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.95 64
High −0.065∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.98 64
Germanyb
All −0.116∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.99 192
Low −0.047∗∗ (0.021) 0.99 64
Medium −0.116∗∗∗ (0.038) 0.98 64
High −0.167∗∗ (0.078) 0.96 64
UKc
All −0.133∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.99 192
Low −0.072∗∗ (0.030) 0.99 64
Medium −0.143∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.99 64
High −0.249∗∗∗ (0.083) 0.97 64
OLS
Denmark
All −0.040∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.99 192
Low −0.039∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.99 64
Medium −0.046∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.98 64
High −0.023∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.99 64
Germany
All −0.023∗∗ (0.009) 0.99 192
Low −0.037∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.99 64
Medium −0.016 (0.012) 0.99 64
High −0.059∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.97 64
UK
All −0.041∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.99 192
Low −0.024 (0.023) 0.99 64
Medium −0.078∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.99 64
High −0.047∗ (0.027) 0.98 64
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.– ***,
**, * denote the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-significance levels, respectively.–
Dependent variable is the log wage in each education-experience
class.– Macroeconomic controls are real GDP growth rate, over-
all inflation, and the export propensity index, as well as educa-
tion specific deterministic time trends and education-experience
dummies. All estimations are weighted (see main text). –
IVs are the lagged log export demand variable and the lagged
industry-mix variable.
a The p-value of the Hansen-J-statistic is 0.93, the Kleibergen-
Paap F -statistic for weak instruments is 6.65 and the
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test statistic for underidentification is
21.11 in the pooled Danish regression.
b The p-value of the Hansen-J-statistic is 0.59, the Kleibergen-
Paap F -statistic for weak instruments is 14.61 and the
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test statistic for underidentification is
24.13 in the pooled German regression.
c The p-value of the Hansen-J-statistic is 0.74, the Kleibergen-
Paap F -statistic for weak instruments is 36.91 and the
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test statistic for underidentification is
24.24 in the pooled UK regression.
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The first panel in Table 3 presents the 2sls regression results for Denmark, Germany
and the UK. All regressions have the expected negative sign and the coefficient on the
unemployment rate appears significant or highly significant in all segments of labor mar-
ket in all countries. The pooled regression results (across all three skill groups combined)
indicate that the elasticity of the wage-setting curve is relatively high in the United King-
dom (−0.133) and lower in Germany (−0.116) and Denmark (−0.115). The pooled results
confirm by and large the estimates in the regional wage curve literature, which usually
find an elasticity of about −0.1 (Bell et al., 2002; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994; 2005).
The absolute value of the elasticity of the wage-setting curve is thus largest in the UK,
i.e. in that country where wages are set at the firm level, where union density is low,
where employment protection is weak and the replacement rate is low compared to the
other countries. This confirms our a priori expectations. The differences to Germany and
Denmark are however not that large, although particularly Denmark is characterized by
a higher coverage of collective wage contracts and union density.
The estimation results by skill groups reveal interesting insights as well. In Germany
and the UK, the absolute value of the elasticity of the wage-setting curve is monotonically
increasing with the skill level, suggesting that wage-flexibility is highest in the labor market
segment of workers with a college or university degree. This might reflect the fact that
the union density is lower there and collective wage contracts are less effective in this
segment. In contrast, we find that the elasticity of the wage-setting curve is lowest in the
high-skilled segment in Denmark, while we find the largest elasticity in the low skilled
segment there. This can be explained by two institutional features. First, in contrast to
Germany and the UK, union density is not declining and collective wage agreements are
still effective in the high-skilled segment of the Danish labor market. Second, high and
progressives taxes result in higher wage requests and a lower wage responsiveness for high
and medium skilled workers in Denmark (Lockwood et al., 2000). IT is also worthwhile
to note that the overall differences in the elasticities e.g. between the UK and Denmark
are larger when we consider the results from the different skill-groups compared to the
aggregate estimates.
Our test results support in general our instrumentation strategy. The Hansen-J -
statistics do not reject the null of no overidentification in all three countries. The Kleiber-
gen Paap rk LM -statistics rejects the null of underidentification at the 1% level in all three
countries. In Germany and Denmark high values of the Kleibergen Pap rK F -test statis-
tics reject the hypothesis that the instruments are weak and suggest that the estimation
bias is small. However, the rather low level of the F -test statistics suggest that our IVs
may be weak in Denmark. Nevertheless, since the size of the coefficients look reasonable
and since they appear as highly significant also in the OLS regressions, we think that the
potential estimation bias is not too severe even in this case.
The second panel in Table 3 reports the pooled OLS estimation results The OLS
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regressions deliver in all regressions the correct signs. Moreover, the aggregate regressions
appear highly significant in all three countries, and the regressions by education groups also
in Denmark and – with one exception – Germany. In the UK, one coefficient is weakly
significant and another one insignificant. Altogether we interpret the results from the
OLS regressions as reassuring, although we believe that the OLS estimates are downward
biased.
4.2 Labor demand equations
For the estimation of the labor demand equation, we have to impose some structure on the
aggregate production function of the economy. In the same way as Borjas (2003), Bru¨cker
and Jahn (2011) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012) we follow Card and Lemieux (2001) and use
a nested CES production function. More specifically, we employ a four-level production
function which groups the workforce into q = 1, . . . , 3 education groups, j = 1, . . . , 4
work experience groups, and k = 1, 2 (native, foreign) nationality groups. Although the
nested CES function imposes some restrictions on the elasticities of substitution, it has
the advantage that it is parsimonious in its parameters.
Suppose that aggregate production in equation (2) can be represented by a standard
Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = AtL
α
t K
1−α
t , (9)
where Yt denotes aggregate output, At is an exogenous parameter which captures total
factor productivity, Lt is aggregate labor input, Kt is physical capital, α is the production
elasticity of labor, and t is a time index.
The aggregate labor input, Lt, can be built up from Lqjkt, the number of workers of
education q, experience j and national origin k in the following way:
Lqjt =
[
2∑
k=1
θqjkL
(σ−1)/σ
qjkt
]σ/(σ−1) 2∑
k=1
θqjk = 1, (10)
Lqt =
 4∑
j=1
θqjL
(ρ−1)/ρ
qjt
ρ/(ρ−1) 4∑
j=1
θqj = 1, (11)
Lt =
 3∑
q=1
θqtL
(δ−1)/δ
qt
δ/(δ−1) 3∑
q=1
θqt = 1. (12)
Thus, Lqt is a labor composite that aggregates all workers with education q and Lqjt
aggregates native and migrant workers of education q and experience j. The technology
parameters θqt, θqj , and θqjk determine the productivity levels of the respective factor.
We allow the productivity parameter θqt to vary over time since skill-biased technological
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progress might affect the productivity of various types of labor in different ways (Katz and
Murphy, 1992). The other production parameters are assumed to be constant over time.
Finally, δ > 0, ρ > 0, and σ > 0 are constant parameters measuring the elasticity of
substitution between labor of different educational levels, between workers with similar
education but different work experience, and between native and migrant workers with
similar education and experience levels. Our a priori expectation is that workers within
each experience group are closer substitutes than those across skill groups, which implies
that ρ > δ.
Based on equation (3) we can write the real wage rate as the marginal product of labor
divided by the mark-up factor. Using the nested CES production function we thus write
the log wage of a worker with skill q, experience j and national origin k as
lnwqjkt = ln
(
ν−1αA1/αt
)
+
1
δ
lnLt + ln θqt −
(
1
δ
− 1
ρ
)
lnLqt (13)
+ ln θqj −
(
1
ρ
− 1
σ
)
lnLqjt + ln θqjk − 1
σ
lnLqjkt +
1− α
α
lnκt,
where κt ≡ Kt/Yt denotes the capital-output ratio.
From equation (13) we can derive the labor demand functions. Our identification
strategy differs from that traditionally used in the literature. As noted, the standard
literature applying a production function framework treats labor supply as inelastic and
exogenous and assumes that labor markets clear. Consequently, they use employment as
the exogenous and wages as the endogenous variable (Card and Lemieux, 2001; Borjas,
2003; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). In contrast, it follows from our wage-setting framework
that labor demand is endogenously determined once wages are fixed. Employment is
therefore the dependent variable, and the wage is the independent variable.
Let us start with the identification of the elasticity of substitution between native and
foreign workers. Based on equation (13) we can express the relative demand for native
and foreign workers with education q and experience j as
ln (Lqj1t/Lqj2t) = σ ln (θqj1/θqj2)− σ ln (wqj1t/wqj2t) ,
where the index k = 1, 2 denotes natives and foreigners respectively. We estimate this
equation as
ln (Lqj1t/Lqj2t) = Dqj − σ ln (wqj1t/wqj2t) + εqjt, (14)
where Dqj denotes a vector of dummy variables for each education-experience cell and
εqjt a zero-mean disturbance term. Notice that by using the ratio of the wage equations
for natives and foreigners, the education and experience levels of the nested production
function disappear, such that we do not have to use control variables in estimating the
elasticity of substitution between natives and foreigners.
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Following the approach of Ottaviano and Peri (2012) the dummy variables in each
education-experience cell capture the log of the relative labor productivity of natives and
foreigners times the elasticity of substitution. This implies that the relative productivity
of natives and immigrants varies across education and experience groups but is constant
over time.16
Estimating equation (14) by OLS suffers from simultaneity bias when an unobserved
shock to labour demand raises the wage and, thus, biases the estimated coefficient towards
zero. A suitable instrumental variable thus has to move the wage without directly affect-
ing labour demands. Those instruments could refer to the reservation wage. Variables
which approximate the reservation wage are valid instruments if they affect wages, but
not directly labour demand (only via the wage rate).
Although the rationale behind our instruments is the same, we were not able find
exactly the same instruments in all three countries which full-fill the exclusion restrictions
and are strongly correlated with the wage rate at the same time. This can be traced back
to data limitations, but also to institutional differences which affect economic behaviour in
different ways in different countries. In Denmark and Germany we have chosen children of
employed persons as an instrument for the reservation wage, although the definition differs
between the two countries: In Denmark our instrument is the average age of the youngest
child, while in Germany it is the average number of children in the age group between
eight and sixteen years.17 Note that childcare is poor in Germany in this age group,
while the government provides comprehensive childcare for all age groups in Denmark.
Children turned out to be only weakly correlated with the wage rate in the UK case. For
avoiding estimation bias, we decided therefore to use the median household income of
the unemployed as an instrument, which again affects the reservation wage and is more
strongly correlated with the wage rate than the number or the age of children in the UK
case.
For the estimation of the elasticity of substitution we used in addition a government
ideology index as an instrumental variable in all three countries. This instrument is
calculated as the share of left- and right-wing parties in the government weighted by their
seats in parliament (Bjørnskov, 2008).18 It captures government policies and legislation
that can affect reservation wages through different channels, such as progressive taxation,
generosity of welfare benefits, and so on. Note that foreigners’ access to welfare benefits
is a core issue in the policy debate, which in turn affects relative reservation wages for
foreigners and natives. Finally, in the UK we use the annual minimum wage in British
Pounds for adult workers as an instrument, which should affect wages of natives and
16Borjas et al. (2008) suggest also including interaction dummies of the education-experience-specific
fixed effects with linear time trends, which would absorb a large part of the identifying variation. However,
there is no empirical evidence that the relative labor productivity of foreigners has changed systematically
over time at a given level of education and work experience.
17The average number of children by age groups is not available in the Danish IDA data set.
18We are grateful to Christian Bjørnskov who provided the ideology indices.
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foreigners again in different ways.
Table 4: 2SLS-estimates of the elasticity of substitution between natives and
foreigners
Denmarka Germanyb UKc
−σ −16.906∗∗∗ −6.713∗∗∗ −8.891∗∗∗
(2.259) (0.802) (1.248)
Hansen J-statistics (p-value) 0.52 0.20 0.76
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 19.67 20.59 11.02
Kleibergen-Paap LM-statistic 30.49 36.26 34.40
R2 0.42 0.92 0.78
Observations 204 214 215
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. – ***, **, * denote the
1%-, 5%-, 10%-significance levels, respectively. – All estimations include a full set
of education-experience controls. All estimations are weighted (see main text).
a IVs are average age of youngest child of employed persons within each education-
experience group, a government ideology index and its lag.
b IVs are ratio of the average number of children of employed persons in an age
between 8 and 16 of natives to immigrants within each education-experience group,
a government ideology index and its lag.
c IVs are ratio of the median household income of unemployed individuals between
natives and immigrants, the annual minimum wage of adult workers in British
Pounds, and a government ideology index.
Table 4 presents the 2SLS estimates of equation (14). In all three countries we have the
expected signs for the elasticity of substitution. We find that the elasticity of substitution
between natives and foreigners is relatively high in Denmark (−11.1), but relatively low
in the United Kingdom (−8.9) and Germany (−6.7).
Our estimates are slightly higher than those of Manacorda et al. (2012) for the UK),
who estimate an elasticity of −7.8. In Germany, our estimates are quite similar to that es-
timated by Bru¨cker and Jahn (2011) (−7.0) and Felbermayr et al. (2010) (−7.4), but much
lower than the estimates by D’Amuri et al. (2010) (−21.7).19 For Denmark, comparable
estimates do not exist, to the best of our knowledge.
The finding that natives and immigrants are imperfect substitutes in the labor market
has important consequences for the wage and employment effects of immigration. The
lower the elasticity of substitution between natives and immigrants the more are the
adverse labor market effects of immigration concentrated in the foreigner cells of the labor
market. Our findings indicate that foreigners are particularly affected in Germany, while
the effects are more dispersed across the native and foreigner cells in the UK and, in
particular, Denmark.
Given the high relevance of this elasticity and the ongoing controversies in the literature
on its extent, we have carried out several robustness checks which should deliver additional
19Note that D’Amuri et al. (2010) employ another estimation and instrumentation strategy.
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insights on how sensitive estimates of the elasticities of substitution respond to different
specifications (see Table 5).
Table 5: Robustness checks: 2SLS-estimates of the (negative) elasticity of
substitution between natives and foreigners
Denmarka Germanyb UKc
Baseline −16.906∗∗∗ −6.713∗∗∗ −8.891∗∗∗
(2.259) (0.802) (1.248)
OLS −7.638∗∗∗ −2.571∗∗∗ −2.916∗∗∗
(0.610) (0.382) (0.246)
Log mean wages −16.676∗∗∗ −6.322∗∗∗ −8.734∗∗∗
(2.059) (0.759) (1.146)
Cell size weighted −13.538∗∗∗ −7.977∗∗∗ −10.680∗∗∗
(1.674) (1.100) (2.673)
Occupation −13.360∗∗∗ −5.768∗∗∗ −16.601∗∗∗
(1.240) (0.754) (2.580)
Revised experience −14.701∗∗∗ −6.439∗∗∗ −9.615∗∗
(2.081) (0.912) (4.464)
Occupupation −15.520∗∗∗ −6.719∗∗∗ −25.049∗∗
and revised experience (1.849) (0.892) (11.395)
Standard errors in parentheses.– ***, **, * denote the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-
significance levels, respectively.
First, we have estimated our model by OLS. The coefficients still appear highly signifi-
cant in all three countries, but have only between one-third and 50 percent of the size of the
2SLS estimates. Nevertheless, against the background of our theoretical considerations,
we believe that the OLS estimates are downward biased.
Second, we proved whether our findings respond sensitively with respect to the specifi-
cation of the dependent variable. Borjas et al. (2012) claim that the scale of the elasticity
depends inter alia largely on whether the log of mean wages or the mean of log wages
is used as the dependent variable since the the first measure is more vulnerable to sam-
pling error. This is not supported by our findings: Using the mean log wage delivers only
marginally different results compared to regressions which employ the log mean wage as
the dependent variable.
Third, we have replaced the analytical weight in our regressions. While the baseline
specification follows Borjas et al. (2012) in using the inverse variance of the log wage
ratio as the weight, we use here following Ottaviano and Peri (2012) the average cell size
measured by the number of employed workers as an alternative. This delivers somewhat
larger coefficients in the case of Germany and the UK, and a smaller one in Denmark.
However, the differences are within the limits of one standard deviation in case of Germany
and the UK, and only slightly larger in the case of Denmark.
Fourth, the classification of education groups can bias our results if immigrants are
severely affected by skill-downgrading. We have therefore reclassified the education groups
by occupation in order to avoid that misclassification affects our findings. The results are
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mixed: While classifying individuals by occupation delivers smaller elasticities in case of
Denmark and Germany, the elasticity increases substantially in the UK:
Finally, there is ample evidence that downgrading can also affect work experience.
Dustmann and Preston (2012) finds that the returns to work experience of immigrants
are well below those of natives in the first tend years after arrival, but tend to converge
largely after that time period. As a robustness check, we reclassified therefore the work
experience: During the first ten years after arrival, we counted only the work experience
obtained in the host country.20 After that, we counted the entire work experience. Albeit
crude, this reclassification should at least provide a hint how robust our findings are.
Interestingly enough, the reclassification of experience groups does not largely change the
results in Germany and the UK, and reduces only slightly the elasticity in Denmark.
Altogether, we conclude that our estimates are relatively robust with respect to differ-
ent definitions of the dependent variable, weighting schemes and classifications of education
and experience groups.
In the next step we estimate the elasticity of substitution between experience groups.
Using equation (13) we can estimate the demand for the labor composite Lqjt as
lnLqjt = Dt +Dqt +Dqj − ρ lnwqjt + υqjt, (15)
where the Dt fixed effects control for the variance of
ρ ln
(
ν−1αA1/αt κ
(1−α)/α
t
)
+
ρ
δ
lnLt,
the Dqt fixed effects control for the variation in
ρ ln θqt −
(ρ
δ
− 1
)
lnLqt,
and the Dqj fixed effects control for the variance in ρ ln θqj (the productivity term times
the elasticity of substitution), which is assumed to be constant over time. υqjt denotes the
zero-mean disturbance.
The labor composite is then calculated as
Lˆqjt =
[
θˆqj1L
(σˆ−1)/σˆ
qj1t + θˆqj2L
(σˆ−1)/σˆ
qj2t
]σˆ/(σˆ−1)
where we use our estimates of the education-experience-specific fixed effects from equation
(14) to calculate the productivity parameters for native and foreign workers as
θˆqj1 =
exp(Dˆqj/σˆ)
1 + exp(Dˆqj/σˆ)
20In Denmark and Germany, the administrative data provide no information on the year of arrival We
used the information on the first observation in the data set instead. Given the long time dimension of
these data set, we can rule out that individuals have participated in the labour force before that date.
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and
θˆqj2 =
1
1 + exp(Dˆqj/σˆ)
.
We estimate equation (15) by 2SLS since it might be again suffer from simultane-
ous equation bias. We apply in each country the same instrumental variables as in the
estimates for the elasticity of substitution between natives and immigrants: the age of
the youngest child in Denmark, the average number of children in the age group eight to
sixteen in Germany and the mean household income of the unemployed in the UK. All
measures are calculated for each education-experience group. Note that we can not use
macro instruments such as the government ideology index or the minimum wage here,
since these variables would be perfectly collinear with the time-fixed effects.
Table 6: 2SLS estimates of the elasticity of substitution across
education-experience groups
Denmarka Germanyb UKc
−ρ −7.740∗∗∗ −5.569∗∗ −7.148∗
(1.604) (2.465) (4.093)
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 24.82 30.59 4.61
Kleibergen-Paap LM-statistic 17.90 20.32 3.31
R2 0.99 0.98 0.96
Observations 204 216 216
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. – ***, **, * denote the
1%-, 5%-, 10%-significance levels, respectively. – All estimations include a full
set of education-experience controls, time controls and education specific time
dummies. All estimations are weighted (see main text).
a Instrument: Average age of youngest child of employed workers within each
education-experience group.
b Instrument: Average number of children of employed workers in age between 8
and 16 within each education-experience group.
c Instrument: Median household income of the unemployed within each education-
experience group.
The estimates of (15) are exactly identified, such that we cannot test for the validity of
our instruments. The F -test statistics suggests that our IVs are strong in case of Denmark
and Germany, but this is not to be the case in the UK: The regression results have to be
taken with a grain of salt there. The results indicate that the elasticity of substitution
across experience cells is highest in Denmark (−7.7), followed by the UK (−7.1) and
Germany (−5.5). The results for Germany are higher than those found by D’Amuri et al.
(2010) (−3.2), but below the estimates by Bru¨cker and Jahn (2011) (−8.6) and Felbermayr
et al. (2010) (−13.0). In the UK the results are somewhat larger than those obtained by
Manacorda et al. (2012) (−5.1).
Overall, our results for all three countries are consistent with those found using the
standard identification strategy in the international literature (see e.g. Katz and Murphy,
1992, Card and Lemieux, 2001, Borjas, 2003, Ottaviano and Peri, 2012).
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Finally, the elasticity of substitution between education groups is estimated analo-
gously as
ln Lˆqt = Dt +Dq + βqτqt − δ lnwqt + ξqt, (16)
where the time-specific fixed effects Dt control for the variance of
δ ln
(
ν−1αA1/αt κ
(1−α)/α
t
)
+ lnLt
and other macroeconomic fluctuations. The education-specific fixed effects Dq and the
education-specific deterministic time trend τqt control for the variance in the term δ ln θqt,
which captures the variance in the skill-specific productivity parameter which is driven,
inter alia, by skill-biased technological progress (see Katz and Murphy, 1992 for a similar
specification). ξqt denotes a zero-mean random disturbance.
The labor composite Lˆqt is computed as
Lˆqt =
 4∑
j=1
θˆqjLˆ
(ρˆ−1)/ρˆ
qjt
ρˆ/(ρˆ−1)
where the estimated efficiency parameters θˆqj are derived from the fixed-effects estimates
as
θˆqj =
exp(Dˆqj/ρˆ)∑
j exp(Dˆqj/ρˆ)
.
We estimate equation (16) again by 2SLS using the average age of the youngest child,
the average number of children in the age group between eight and sixteen and the median
household income in each education group in Denmark, Germany and the UK, respectively,
as instruments.
The regression diagnostics presented in Table 7 suggests that the instruments are strong
and reject the hypothesis of underidentification in all three countries. The estimated
elasticity of substitution between education groups is again largest in Germany (−4.4)
followed by the UK (−4.0) and Denmark (−2.7). Our results for Germany are somewhat
higher than those found by Bru¨cker and Jahn (2011) (−2.9) and D’Amuri et al. (2010)
(−2.9), while those found in the UK are slightly than those found by Manacorda et al.
(2012) (−4.9).
In summary, we find that — as predicted by our nested CES-production function —
the elasticity of substitution between natives and foreigners is larger than the elasticity
of substitution between experience groups, and that the elasticity of substitution between
experience groups is larger than that between education groups. The estimates from
our 2SLS regressions deliver overall comparable results for the elasticities of substitution
between natives and immigrants found in other studies for Germany and the UK. The
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Table 7: 2SLS estimates of the elasticity of substitution between education
groups
Denmarka Germanyb UKc
−δ −2.711∗∗∗ −4.356∗∗∗ −3.950∗∗∗
(0.958) (0.651) (0.253)
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 118.56 72.90 51.02
Kleibergen-Paap LM-statistic 13.71 7.89 21.71
R2 0.91 0.80 0.96
Observations 51 54 54
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. – ***, **, * denote
the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-significance levels, respectively. – All estimations include a
full set of time controls and an education specific deterministic time trend. All
estimations are weighted (see main text).
a Instrument: Average age of youngest child of employed workers within each edu-
cation group.
b Instrument: Average number of children of employed workers in age between 8
and 16 within each education group.
c Instrument: Median household income of the unemployed within each education
group.
OLS estimates are substantially lower, but we believe that simultaneous equation biases
requires an instrumental variable estimation strategy. The estimates for the elasticities
are by and large also in the range of other findings in the literature.
5 Simulating the impact of immigration
To calculate the wage effects of a labor supply shock due to immigration, we first compute
the employment effects. The general solution for the employment effects is given in equa-
tion (6), and an explicit solution for our case with 24 types of labor and a nested CES
production function is provided in Appendix A.
In the second step, we differentiate the wage equation (13) with respect to the em-
ployment changes in all cells of the labor market and with respect to a change in the
capital-output ratio triggered by immigration. This gives us the wage response to immi-
gration:
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dwqjkt
wqjkt
=
1
δ
∑
z
∑
x
∑
m
(
szxmt
dLzxmt
Lzxmt
)
(17)
−
(
1
δ
− 1
ρ
)
1
sqt
∑
x
∑
m
(
sqxmt
dLqxmt
Lqxmt
)
−
(
1
ρ
− 1
σ q
)
1
sqjt
∑
m
(
sqjmt
dLqjmt
Lqjmt
)
− 1
σq
(
dLqjkt
Lqjkt
)
+
1− α
α
dκt
κt
,
where z = 1, . . . , 3 indexes education, x = 1, . . . , 4 work experience, m = 1, 2 national
origin, and s denotes the share of wages paid to workers in the respective labor market
cell in the total wage bill:
sqjkt =
wqjktLqjkt∑
z
∑
x
∑
mwzxmtLzxmt
,
sqjt =
∑
mwqjmtLqjmt∑
z
∑
x
∑
mwzxmtLzxmt
,
sqt =
∑
x
∑
mwqxmtLqxmt∑
z
∑
x
∑
mwzxmtLzxmt
.
In this section we simulate the case of a one percent labor supply shock through
immigration at the education-experience structure of the immigrant labor force at the end
of the sample periods. Our simulations are based on the elasticities of the wage-setting
curves in the different segments of the labor market, and the elasticities of substitution
between natives and foreigners, experience and education groups. For the simulation of
the labor supply shock we use the education and experience structure of the foreign labor
force at the end of the sample period in each country.
We simulate both a short- and a long-run scenario. In the simulations of the short-run
impact of immigration we assume that the capital stock remains fixed. In the long-
run simulations we assume that the capital stock adjusts completely to an aggregate
labor supply shock, such that the capital-output ratio is fixed. The latter assumption
is empirically supported by the Kaldor facts on economic growth and can be explained,
inter alia, by international capital mobility (see Ottaviano and Peri, 2012, for a discussion).
Note that empirical estimates suggest that the capital stock adjusts rather fast to labor
supply changes (see Bru¨cker and Jahn, 2008, for German evidence, and Ottaviano and
Peri, 2012, Ottaviano and Peri, 2008 for US evidence).
The parameters for the wage-setting curves are taken from our estimates of equation
(8) and the estimates of σ, ρ, and δ from equations (14) – (16). Following the literature, we
set α to 0.67 (e.g. Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2001). Having calculated the employment effects
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of immigration, we use equation (13) for the calculation of the wage effect. The shares
of education and education-experience groups in the total wage bill are taken from our
data sets. Note that the mark-up factor is a constant that cancels out when we calculate
changes of wage and (un-)employment levels.
Finally, we provide standard errors for our simulations. The standard errors are ob-
tained by a bootstrapping procedure, which draws first for each parameter 1000 values
from a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation being equal to the estimated
coefficient and standard error, respectively. Then the model is simulated 1000 times and
the mean and standard deviation of all simulations are reported in the table.
Table 8 presents the simulation results for Denmark, Germany, and the UK. We have
calculated the average effects for the total labor force, the native labor force, and the for-
eign labor force by educational levels. For the calculation of the average effects, we weight
the wage changes by the income share in each cell, and the changes in the unemployment
rate by the share in the labor force in each cell.
The aggregate results indicate that a one percent immigration reduces wages in the
UK by 0.26%, by 0.22% in Denmark and only by 0.14% in Germany in the short-term.
In the long-run scenario, the aggregate wage effects disappear by assumption. Note that
this assumption is however empirically supported by the Kaldor facts and the empirical
evidency provided by Bru¨cker and Jahn (2008) and Ottaviano and Peri (2008, 2012).
For the unemployment rate, the opposite picture emerges. We find that a one percent
labor supply shock through immigration increases the unemployment rate in the short
term by 0.36 percentage points in Germany, but by 0.18 percentage points in Denmark
and 0.20 percentage points in the UK. In the first place, this result can be traced back
to the different elasticities of the wage-setting curves in our three countries. Differences
in the labor supply shocks across education, experience and national origin cells of the
labor market play also a role. The skill level of the immigrant workforce is particularly
low in Germany, such that the labor supply shock affects labor market cells with low wage
flexibility and high unemployment. In contrast, immigrants are relatively skilled in the
UK, such that immigration involves large wage and low unemployment effects there. In
the long-term, after the adjustment of capital stocks, we find that the unemployment rate
increases by 0.17 percentage points in Germany and by 0.13 percentage points in Denmark,
while it declines slightly by 0.10 percentage points in the UK. Note that migration can
involve changes in the unemployment rate even after the adjustment of capital stocks if
the composition of the workforce, and, hence, the unemployment risks of the labor force
changes. While immigrants increase the labor supply in segments with less wage flexibility
and higher unemployment in Denmark and Germany, the reverse is true for the UK.
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Table 8 presents the simulation results for Denmark, Germany, and the UK. We have
calculated the average effects for the total labor force, the native labor force, and the for-
eign labor force by educational levels. For the calculation of the average effects, we weight
the wage changes by the income share in each cell, and the changes in the unemployment
rate by the share in the labor force in each cell.
The aggregate results indicate that a one percent immigration reduces wages in the
UK by 0.29%, but only by 0.15% in Denmark and by 0.16% in Germany in the short-term.
However, the Kaldor facts and the empirical findings by Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and
others suggest that capital stocks adjust fast to labor supply shocks, if not immediately.
Not surprisingly, the aggregate wage effects of immigration disappear completely after
capital stock adjustment in all three countries.
For the unemployment rate, the opposite picture emerges. We find that a one percent
labor supply shock through immigration increases the unemployment rate in the short
term by 0.35 percentage points in Germany, by 0.20 percentage points in Denmark, but
only by 0.11 percentage points in the UK. In the first place, this result can be traced back
to the different elasticities of the wage-setting curves in our three countries. Differences
in the labor supply shocks across education, experience and national origin cells of the
labor market play also a role. The skill level of the immigrant workforce is particularly
low in Germany, such that the labor supply shock affects labor market cells with low wage
flexibility and high unemployment. In contrast, immigrants are relatively skilled in the
UK, such that immigration involves large wage and low unemployment effects there. In
the long-term, after the adjustment of capital stocks, we find that the unemployment rate
increases by 0.17 percentage points in Germany and by 0.13 percentage points in Denmark,
while it declines slightly by 0.10 percentage points in the UK. Note that migration can
involve changes in the unemployment rate even after the adjustment of capital stocks if
the composition of the workforce, and, hence, the unemployment risks of the labor force
changes. While immigrants increase the labor supply in segments with less wage flexibility
and higher unemployment in Denmark and Germany, the reverse is true for the UK.
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Table 9: Simulated wage effects of an immigration of 1% of the labor force
Denmark Germany UK
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run
Wage
change
Wage
change
Wage
change
Wage
change
Wage
change
Wage
change
Natives and foreigners
All education groups −0.28 − −0.25 − −0.33 −
(0.00) − (0.00) − (0.00) −
Lowe −0.41 −0.13 −0.72 −0.47 −0.18 0.15
(0.28) (0.28) (0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01)
Mediume −0.22 0.07 −0.23 0.02 −0.36 −0.04
(0.14) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Highe −0.37 −0.09 −0.21 0.05 −0.48 −0.16
(0.19) (0.19) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Natives
All education groups −0.23 0.05 −0.13 0.12 −0.21 0.12
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Low −0.34 −0.06 −0.30 −0.05 −0.13 0.19
(0.28) (0.28) (0.12) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01)
Medium −0.18 0.11 −0.13 0.12 −0.23 0.09
(0.14) (0.14) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
High −0.31 −0.02 −0.12 0.13 −0.30 0.03
(0.19) (0.19) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Foreigners
All education groups −1.31 −1.02 −1.41 −1.16 −1.13 −0.80
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Low −1.41 −1.13 −1.55 −1.30 −1.00 −0.68
(0.32) (0.32) (0.21) (0.21) (0.12) (0.12)
Medium −1.23 −0.95 −1.37 −1.12 −1.10 −0.78
(0.19) (0.19) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11)
High −1.36 −1.08 −1.36 −1.11 −1.18 −0.85
(0.24) (0.24) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
See notes in Table 8
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In all three countries we observe that native workers benefit both in terms of higher
wages and lower unemployment risks from immigration, at least in the long-term. This is
caused by the limited elasticity of substitution between native and foreign workers in each
education-experience cell of the labor market and by differences in the skill and experience
composition of the native and immigrant workforce. The results are particularly large in
the UK case, where native wages increase by 0.11% and the unemployment risk of natives
declines by 0.22 percentage points.
Earlier migrants are the main losers from further immigration. Their wages decline
by 1.7% in Denmark, 1.4% in Germany and 1.2% in the UK, while their unemployment
rates increase by 2.5 percentage points in Denmark, 3.0 percentage points in Germany
and 0.9 percentage points in the UK in the short-term. The long-term effects are only
slightly smaller. The differences across the three countries can be explained both by the
different elasticities of substitution between natives and foreigners and by the different
elasticities of the wage-setting curves. In particular, there are less pronounced effects in
the UK since the elasticity of substitution between natives and foreigners is much higher
there compared to the other two countries. Altogether, we can conclude that the existing
foreign workforce suffers from immigration, while the native workforce tends to benefit.
Finally, we find different effects in different education groups across the three countries
considered here. In Germany we find particularly large wage and unemployment effects in
the less-skilled segment of the labor market, while the high-skilled are more affected in the
UK, and, to a lesser extent, in Denmark. These differences between the three countries are
caused by the different skill structure of the foreign workforce, and, hence, the different
skill structure of the simulated labor supply shocks.
6 Conclusions
The great majority of existing studies on the wage effects of migration rely on the assump-
tion of clearing labor markets. Therefore, they do not consider the role of labor market
institutions and policies in shaping the impact of migration. Nor do they allow a role for
unemployment. Because institutions and policies differ significantly between countries,
in this paper we take a comparative perspective in a setting with imperfect labor mar-
kets. We apply an estimation and instrumentation strategy which does not rely on the
assumption of clearing labor markets, and we derive the wage and unemployment effects
simultaneously from a coherent framework which considers wage rigidities.
Our findings suggest that labor market institutions do play an important role in deter-
mining the wage and employment effects of immigration. In the UK, where labor markets
are characterized (both in the literature and according to our estimates) by a high level of
wage flexibility we find the highest elasticity between wages and unemployment, followed
by Germany and Denmark. Interestingly, we find that wage flexibility is particularly low
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in Denmark. This can be explained by a higher union density, a higher coverage of col-
lective bargaining and higher unemployment benefits compared to the other countries,
although employment protection is weak and the level of centralized collective bargaining
is similar to that of Germany. Another intriguing finding is that the elasticity between
wages and unemployment tends to increase monotonically with the skill level of workers in
Germany and the UK, while it tends to decline in Denmark. While the former result can
be explained by a lower union density and coverage of collective bargaining in the high
skilled segments of the labor markets in Germany and the UK, the latter finding might
be caused by the progressive tax system and the high level of union density and collective
bargaining coverage for high skilled workers in Denmark.
As a consequence of the varying degrees of wage flexibility we find considerable differ-
ences in the effects of immigration on wages and employment in the three countries. Our
estimates indicate that the impact of immigration on unemployment is particularly low in
the UK in the short-term. However, the wage effects are about twice as high compared to
Germany and Denmark, where the flexibility of labor markets, measured in terms of the
elasticity of the wage-setting curve, is lower. Conversely, the short-term effects of immi-
gration on unemployment exceed that of the UK by a factor of three in Germany and by
a factor of two in Denmark. In the long term, under the empirically supported assump-
tion that capital stocks adjust to labor supply shocks, immigration does not affect wages.
However, since immigration affects the composition of the workforce, unemployment tends
to increase slightly in Germany and Denmark and to decline in the UK. The latter finding
can be traced back to the fact that immigration increases labor supply in the flexible
segments of the labor market (i.e. the high-skilled segment) and creates additional labor
demand in the less flexible segments in the UK. Due to the higher wage flexibility and
the relatively skilled immigrant labor force the overall effects of immigration are therefore
much more favorable in the UK compared to Germany and Denmark.
An important factor which affects our results is the labor market assimilation of im-
migrants, measured in terms of the elasticity of substitution between native and foreign
workers. Again, the labor market assimilation of immigrants might be affected by insti-
tutions. As well as labor market and immigration policies which affect assimilation (such
as language tuition or housing), job turnover may be a crucial factor in determining how
quickly immigrants integrate into the labor market. Note that job turnover rates are
much higher in the United Kingdom and Denmark compared to Germany (Bassanini and
Marianna, 2009). This is supported by our findings: while the elasticity of substitution
between immigrants and natives is relatively high in the United Kingdom and Denmark,
it is particularly low in Germany. This elasticity is crucial in determining the wage and
employment effects of further immigration. The impact on the immigrant workforce is rel-
atively modest in the UK, where the elasticity of substitution is high, while the opposite
is true for Germany, where the elasticity is particularly low. Although we find that the
pre-existing immigrant workforce is the main loser from immigration, the magnitude of
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these effects differs significantly across countries. This suggests that labor market institu-
tions which affect job turnover play an important role in the distribution of the effects of
immigration across different groups in the labor market.
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A Technical Annex: Explicit solution for the employment
response
The general solution for the marginal employment response to an increase in labor supply
through immigration is given in equation (6). The model in Section 2.2 distinguishes 3×
4×2 = 24 types of labor. Using the notation from the nested production function we write
the vector as x = [x111, x112, x121, . . . , x211, . . . , xijk, . . . , x342], where x ∈ {L,N,YL,u, f}.
The subscript 111 therefore indexes the first, 112 the second, 121 the third, and 342 the
24th element of each vector.
Thus, we can write the partial derivative of wages with respect to employment as
∂YL
∂L
=

∂YL111
∂L111
· · · ∂YL111∂Lijk · · ·
∂YL111
∂L342
...
...
...
∂YLijk
∂L111
· · · ∂YLijk∂Lijk · · ·
∂YLijk
∂L342
...
...
...
∂YL342
∂L111
· · · ∂YL342∂Lijk · · ·
∂YL342
∂L342

. (A.1)
Due to the nested structure of the production function we have four types of partial
derivatives in equation (A.1):
∂YLqjk
∂Lqjk
=
wqjk
Lqjk
[
sqjk
{
1
δ
+I∗− 1
sq
(
1
δ
−1
ρ
)
− 1
sqj
(
1
ρ
− 1
σq
)}
− 1
σq
]
,
∂YLqjk
∂Lijk′
=
wqjk
Lijk
[
sqjk′
{
1
δ
+I∗− 1
sq
(
1
δ
−1
ρ
)
− 1
sqj
(
1
ρ
− 1
σq
)}]
,
∂YLqjk
∂Lij′m
=
wqjk
Lqj′m
[
sqj′m
{
1
δ
+I∗− 1
sq
(
1
δ
−1
ρ
)}]
,
∂YLqjk
∂Lq′nm
=
wqjk
Lq′nm
[
sq′xm
{
1
δ
+I∗
}]
,
where k 6= k′, j 6= j′ and q 6= q′, and sqjk, sqj and sq denote the share of wages paid to
workers in the respective cell of the labor market in the total wage bill. The index function
I∗ is
I∗ =
α− 1 in the short run0 in the long run,
which follows from the production function if physical capital is fixed in the short run,
i.e., if K = K, and if the capital-output ratio is constant in the long-run, i.e, if κ = κ.
Using the wage-setting equation in (3) we can write
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∂f
∂u
∂u
∂L
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∂f111
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· · · 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
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0
...
. . .
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, (A.2)
and
∂f
∂u
∂u
∂N
dN
dM
=

∂f111
∂u111
∂u111
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...
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...
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
. (A.3)
Substituting the matrices (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3) into equation (6) yields the marginal
employment response to immigration for the two cases of a fixed capital stock or a constant
capital output ratio.
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B Data Annex (not for publication)
B.1 Labor market and immigration data
The labor market and immigration data which we use for our empirical analysis are taken
from three data sets: the Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (IDA) in Den-
mark, the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) database in Germany, and the UK
Quarterly Labour Force Survey (UK LFS).
As outlined in Section 3 of the main text, the IDA is compiled from a variety of sources
such as the population register, the labor force and unemployment registers and adminis-
trative tax data (Statistics Denmark, 2007). It covers the entire population including all
employed and unemployed persons. Immigrants can be identified both by their country of
birth and citizenship. We use the 1993–2009 period for our analysis.
The IEB is a 5% random sample of all employees registered with the social security
system, and of all unemployment benefit recipients in Germany. Self-employed individuals
and civil servants who are not obliged to pay social security contributions (Beamte) are
not included in the data set. As with the IDA, the IEB is compiled from a variety
of administrative data sources which comprise, inter alia information on employment
histories provided by the German pension system and on unemployed benefit recipients
provided by the Federal Employment Services (Dorner et al., 2010). Due to the German
jus sanguis tradition, the data set identifies foreigners only by citizenship. We use the
1993–2010 period for our analysis (in the estimation of the wage-setting curves: 1993-
2009).
Administrative data on earnings in the UK are not available to researchers. The largest
survey which contains information on migration status is the UK Labour Force Survey,21
a quarterly random sample of 60,000 households. Each quarter of the LFS sample is made
up of five waves, each of approximately 12,000 households. Each wave is interviewed in
five successive quarters. As a result, there is an 80% overlap in the samples for successive
quarters. The UK LFS contains information on wages, qualification, occupational status,
unemployment, the country of birth of foreigners as well as information on citizenship.
Wage information is not available before 1993, so we use the 1993–2010 period in our
analysis (in the estimation of the wage-setting curves: 1993-2009). Building on these data
sources, we used the following classifications and definitions for our empirical analysis (see
Table 10 for an overview).
1. Definition of foreigners: In Denmark foreigners are restricted to first generation
immigrants. A first generation immigrant is defined as an individual who was born
21The Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) provides a larger sample size, but no information
on nationality or country of birth.
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outside Denmark, and who has foreign-born parents or parents with foreign citizen-
ship. If information on one of the parents is missing but the other parent fulfills the
criteria, the individual is also defined as an immigrant. If there is no information on
either of the parents then the individual is defined as a first generation immigrant if
he or she is born outside Denmark.
The German data set provides no information on when immigrants entered the
country or their country of birth. Due to the jus sanguinis tradition of German
law, naturalization rates have been traditionally low, but increased slightly after the
reform of the immigration act in 1999. To mitigate the possible effects of natural-
ization, we have classified all individuals as foreigners who are reported as foreign
citizens in their first available spell since 1975. This prevents naturalization from
being displayed as a declining foreigner share in our sample.
Moreover, since German law regards ethnic German immigrants (Spa¨taussiedler)
as German citizens, the number of immigrants is likely to be underreported in the
IEB. Using information from the benefit recipient file we are able to identify the
majority of the ethnic German immigrants by their participation in language courses
and other integration measures especially designed for this group. In our sample,
the cumulative inflow of ethnic Germans accounts for more than 3 percent of the
German labor force.
In the UK LFS individuals report whether they are born outside the UK. The same
is true for citizenship.
Even after correcting for naturalization and the immigration of ethnic Germans, the
definition of foreigners in the German data still differs from that in the Danish and
the UK data sets, since second and third generation immigrants appear as foreign
citizens in the German data set. As a robustness check, we have created also data
sets where foreigners are defined by citizenship in Denmark and in the UK. It turns
out that our results are qualitatively robust to the different definition of the foreign
workforce.
2. Definition of the employed and unemployed labor force: In Denmark and the UK we
consider males and females aged between 16 and 60; in Germany we restricted our
sample to the labor force aged between 18 and 60 (see below). All samples consists of
wage and salary full-time employees and unemployed persons. We exclude part-time
workers, since the German IEB data set provides only wage information on a daily
basis and hourly wages for part-time workers with few hours are usually known as
of bad quality in Denmark. Full-time employment is defined by 30 working hours or
more in Denmark and the UK. In Germany, employers are obliged to report workers
as full time if the contracted agreed working time equals the usual working time in
the establishment.
Self-employed persons are excluded, since we have no information on the self-employed
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in the German data set and no comparable income information of self-employed are
available in Denmark and the UK. We include employees in the public sector, with
the exception of workers who do not pay social security contributions (’Beamte’ and
marginal employed workers) in Germany.
The definition of unemployment varies slightly across the data sets. While the UK
LFS employs the ILO definition, the register data in Denmark classifies the recip-
ients of unemployment benefits and unemployment allowances as unemployed. In
Germany, the recipients of insurance-based unemployment benefits I and the recipi-
ents of the mean-tested unemployment benefits II (until 2004 unemployment assis-
tance) are defined as unemployed. The 2004 reform of the social security system
in Germany involves an unavoidably structural break in 2005, which increased the
number of unemployed particularly among the younger cohorts as they became eligi-
ble for unemployment benefits II without any prior employment experience. In order
to alleviate that problem we have excluded persons aged below 18 in the German
sample.
3. Definition of wages: In Germany, the wage information in the IEB is used to calculate
social security contributions and is therefore highly reliable. The daily income is
measured in Euro and is right-censored since gross wages can only be observed up
to the social security contribution ceiling. About 9 percent of the employment spells
in the final data set are right-censored. This may affect the estimation of the wage-
setting curve in the high-skilled segments of the labor market. We have therefore
imputed wages above the social security contribution ceiling using a heteroscedastic
single imputation approach specifically developed for the IEB data set Bu¨ttner and
Ra¨ssler (2008). In Denmark the gross hourly wage is measured in DKK. In the UK
information on earnings is only available in interview wave 5 (up to 1996) and in
waves 1 and 5 from 1997 onwards. We use reported gross hourly pay which is either
directly reported or calculated as gross weekly pay in the main job divided by usual
weekly hours worked in the main job.
4. Classification of education groups: In all three countries we distinguish three educa-
tion groups: high, medium and low. This sets our paper apart from the approach of
Katz and Murphy (1992), Card and Lemieux (2001) and Card and Schleifer (2009)
which distinguish only two education classes (tertiary and secondary) as well as from
the approach of Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012), which employ four
groups (college, college drop-outs, high-school and high-school-drop outs). In our
view a distinction of education levels in university degrees, vocational training de-
grees and skilled workers with equivalent qualification levels, and workers without a
vocational training degree or equivalent degrees is more suitable for the conditions
in European labor markets.
In Denmark low skilled workers are defined as those who left school without any
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further education, medium skilled workers have a vocational training degree and
high skilled workers hold at least a bachelor degree. In the German and UK data
set information on the qualification of the foreign workforce is often missing.
In Germany, we imputed the missing information on education by employing a proce-
dure especially developed for the data set by (Fitzenberger et al., 2006), which allows
inconsistent education information to be corrected over time as well. After applying
this imputation procedure, we had to drop about 4 percent of the individuals due
to missing or inconsistent information on education.
In the UK information on qualification levels of foreigners display either high missing
rates or a large share of the foreign workforce is placed in the “other qualifications”
category, even though these workers may have a rather high level of education (see
the evidence provided by Saleheen and Shadforth 2006). We therefore followed the
procedure applied by Manacorda et al. (2012) and used the information on age left
school to classify education groups. This enables us to circumvent the problem of
missing information on the highest qualification degree.
We define a low level of education if an individual leaves school at an age of 17 or
below, a medium level of education if an individual leaves school at an age between
18 and 20, and a high level of education if they leave school at an age of 21 or more.
These three groups capture the three basic levels of educational qualification in the
UK, namely GCSE, A-level and university degree. Other studies have tended to
define “low-skilled” as those who leave school before the age of 16, but, since the
1970s, the majority of school-children in the UK were required to stay at school
until they were 16 (the exception was for those born late in the academic year).
For UK born workers, we can compare the highest educational qualification across
these three groups. 23% of the low-skilled sample report having no qualifications,
compared to 2% of the middle-skilled sample and 0.35% of the high-skilled sample.
5. Classification of experience groups: In all three data sets we distinguish four groups
of work experience: 0 to 5 years, 6 to 10 years, 11 to 20 years, and more than 20
years. This assures that we have sufficient observations in each group in all three
data sets.
B.2 Control variables
The estimates of the wage-setting curves and of the elasticities of substitution consider
a number of variables which control for macroeconomic shocks and other influences at
the aggregate level. The estimates of the wage-setting curves control for real GDP growth
measured at constant prices, the annual inflation rate (measured as the GDP deflator) and
the export propensity rate. The export propensity rate is measured as the ratio between
exports and GDP. In estimating the elasticities of substitution we use time fixed effects to
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control for macroeconomic shocks and other aggregate effects. Definitions of the variables
and data sources are displayed in Table 11.
B.3 Instrumental variables
As outlined in Section 4, we use an industry mix variable and an export demand index as
instrumental variables in the wage-setting equations. The industry mix variables measures
how much of the deviation in employment growth in an education-experience cell from
the average employment growth can be explained by the concentration of workers in the
respective cell in fast- or slow-growing industries. This variable simply measures how
much of the change in employment can be attributed to an exogenous shift of the sectoral
structure, for example due to technological change (Bartik, 1991). It is calculated as
indumixqj =
n∑
h=1
ght
Lqjh,t−1
Lqj,t−1
− gt,
where ght is the employment growth rate in industry h in year t, Lqjh,t−1 is the employment
of education-experience group qj in industry h in year t − 1, Lqj,t−1 is the aggregate
employment of education-experience group qj in year t − 1, and gt the average overall
employment growth rate in year t. The summation is over all two digit, non-agricultural,
private-sector industries in the UK and Denmark and over all manufacturing industries in
Germany.
The export demand variable should capture the size of external demand and is calcu-
lated as the GDP of all trading partners in the OECD at constant prices weighted by their
average share in exports of the respective country during the sample period (in constant
USD in DK and the UK, in constant national currency at PPP in DE).
In the labor demand equations we use the following instruments as approximations
for the reservation wage: first, the average number of dependent children in each cell of
the labor market. The definition of the age groups vary across countries due to different
systems of schooling and child care. Second the ratio of the average income of unemployed
households to that of employed households in each cell of the labor market. Third, the
mean average tax burden. Fourth, an income satisfaction index. Finally, the minimum
wage in the UK.
Definitions of the variables and the data sources are presented in the bottom panel of
Table 11.
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